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ABSTRACT 
RECONCEPTUALIZING HUMAN SECURITY: A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE.  
(May 2012) 
Summer Nicole Forester, B.S., University of West Florida 
M.A., Appalachian State University 
Chairperson: Curtis Ryan 
 Critics of the human security literature claim that current definitions and conceptions 
of human security are too vague to be useful. There is some truth to the critiques; in an effort 
to fill the gaps in the security literature, this paper presents a feminist-based definition of 
human security and tests its relevance through a case study of the political, social and 
economic securities of women in Jordan. The study revealed that women in Jordan—a 
country known for its stability in a tumultuous region—still face a number of threats each 
day. Most notably, political and social insecurities stem from economic insecurity. Within 
Jordan, these findings suggest that nongovernmental agencies and women’s organizations 
should channel funding and efforts into economic enhancement programs. Internationally, 
policymakers should be aware of hidden insecurities within seemingly secure states. 
Furthermore, human security efforts bolster national security efforts and should be 
incorporated into the broader spectrum of security studies.
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CHAPTER 1—INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
The debate about what constitutes security rages among political scientists, 
development scholars, sociologists, security scholars and public health administrators. Even 
with the plethora of literature related to human security, no widely accepted definition and 
measurement of the concept exists. Feminists have led the charge in heralding a human-
centric conception of security; but there is a definite silence in the field regarding defining 
and measuring the term. This paper strives to fill that silence. 
Why would a feminist based definition be any different, much less better, than the 
current definitions of human security? I argue that the feminist devotion to upending 
inequality across all societal dimensions is especially salient when measuring and observing 
imbalances in security. I present the literature on how security has evolved, especially in the 
last thirty years, and highlight the contributions feminists have made to security studies. 
Then, I examine four current definitions of and methodologies for measuring human security. 
When these current constructs are scrutinized under a feminist lens, inherent flaws emerge. 
Literature Review 
Conventional conceptions of security focus on increasing military force and capacity 
while buttressing territorial boundaries in the name of state sovereignty. Realist scholars, 
confident in their Hobbesian appraisal of the world, criticize the concept of individual human 
security as recklessly shifting the priority from hard security to soft security (Fukuyama 
1998; MacFarlane & Khong 2006; Walt 1998). They argue that the definition of security is, 
and always will be, monopolized by a fixation on war; thus, security can be understood only 
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as a state-level phenomenon. As Lawrence Freedman notes: “Once anything that generates 
anxiety or threatens the quality of life in some respect becomes labeled a ‘security problem,’ 
the field risks losing all focus” (1998, p. 53). Roland Paris (2001), too, complains that the 
concept is simply too vague; he aligns human security with sustainable development, in that 
“everyone is for it, but few people have a clear idea of what it means” (p. 88).  
There is some truth to the criticism. Often, when scholars attempt to identify specific 
indicators of individual human security, their justifications seem arbitrary. These indicators 
either reflect the inherent biases of the researcher or are selected based on available data. The 
nature of human security is such that the recommendations for improving the security of 
individuals go hand in hand with policy formations. Thus, critics argue that certain threats are 
prioritized over others to bolster end goals of institutions or policymakers (Grayson 2008; 
Paris 2001). Or, as Robert Cox (1981) concludes, “theory is always for someone and for 
some purpose” (p. 128).  
Conventional conceptions of security promote preserving the status quo of the state. 
Threats that disrupt the status quo (i.e. invasions, nuclear attack) are seen as the most volatile 
type of threat. However, Tickner (1992) highlights a flaw in the logic of upholding the status 
quo, the “hegemonic masculinity” underlying the structure of the international system: 
“Strength, power, autonomy, independence and rationality, all typically associated with men 
and masculinity, are characteristics we most value in those to whom we entrust the conduct 
of our foreign policy and the defense of our national interest” (p. 3). Thus, state-centric 
conceptions of security promote significant inequality by promoting the status quo and 
disregarding its negative effects on a large swath of the population.   
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Thus, proponents of human security argue that state-centric definitions of security are 
too limited and fail to address individual level insecurities that people experience daily. 
While a state may be secure from interstate conflict, particular populations within the state 
may still be at high levels of risk. For instance, the conception of security at a purely state 
level ignores the female experience of security. Cynthia Enloe (1989; 2007) has repeatedly 
revealed how militarism is inversely correlated with the well-being of women and other 
marginalized groups. Her work demonstrates that as states and societies become more 
militarized (i.e. increasing defense budgets, opening more military bases, relinquishing 
personal liberties in the name of national security) the well-being of their female population 
decreases. Defining security in a way that discounts half of the population is clearly 
inadequate.  
Not only does a strict state-centric definition of security disregard the well-being of 
half of the population, but many scholars also argue that the separation of human security 
from state security is impossible. These scholars claim that in a rapidly globalizing world, the 
two spheres are not only intrinsically linked, they are mutually reinforcing (Etzioni, 2007; 
Reveron & Mahoney-Norris 2010). For example, the 2001 report of the Hart-Rudman 
Commission on U.S. National Security identifies education as a core precept of national 
security and, more importantly, aligns the promotion of human rights and basic material 
well-being as a valuable tool for combating world-wide violence (Alkire, 2003, p. 32). 
Analysts recognize that a comprehensive national security plan is contingent on the well-
being of individuals in other states, not merely on the capacity of a foreign government. 
Thus, the need for an individually based definition of security is clear. 
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Feminist scholars have been among the most vehement supporters for the shift from 
state to human-centered security. They contend that continued emphasis on security as the 
promotion of military (masculine) might results in imbalanced power definitions for men and 
women. Men are seen as “the protectors” while women are relegated to the position of “the 
protected” (Hudson, 2005; Tickner, 1992). On the surface this may not seem like a matter of 
security. However, if men are valued more than women, widespread detrimental 
ramifications could result. For example, if a family has limited food supplies and males are 
privileged above females, young girls may go hungry while their brothers are adequately 
nourished (Vlachova & Biason 2005). 
It is important to note that feminist security literature considers more than the 
differences between genders; societal differences between races, ethnicities and class groups 
result in different levels and kinds of threats for these groups. According to this approach, 
attempting to identify universal threats is futile—the population must be disaggregated and 
analyzed to achieve a clear, definitive picture of individual level security (Truong, Wieringa, 
& Chhachhi, 2006; Waylen, 1996). It is worth pointing out that a feminist approach is not 
synonymous with an “anti-male” approach. Feminist scholars recognize that gender includes 
men as well as women, and that not all men share a common social or class status (hooks 
2000; Romaniuk & Wasylciw, 2010). Hence, in order to achieve a complete understanding of 
the various threats to all individuals within a society, we must analyze levels of human 
security along gender, class, and ethnic lines. 
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Defining Human Security 
Of the myriad definitions and measurements of human security, four of the most 
useful are: The 1994 “Human Development Report,” Alkire’s (2003) “A Conceptual 
Framework for Human Security,” King and Murray’s (2000) “Rethinking Human Security” 
and Owen’s (2008) “Measuring Human Security.” Closely reading each work reveals their 
contributions to the field. However, through a feminist conceptualization of security, I will 
show where these definitions and measures are lacking.  
The 1994 “Human Development Report” defines human security as: “safety from the 
constant threats of hunger, disease, crime and repression…[and] protection from sudden and 
hurtful disruptions in the pattern of our daily lives—whether in our homes, in our jobs, in our 
communities or in our environment” (United Nations Development Program [UNDP], 1994, 
p.3). According to this report, human security is universal, its components are 
interdependent, it is best ensured through prevention and it is people centered. A cornerstone 
of the human security paradigm, this conception of security removes the fixation on threats to 
a state’s borders and gives prominence to the insecurities that arise in people’s daily lives. 
The report also divides threats to human security into seven major categories: economic, 
food, health, community, political, environmental and personal.  
The report concedes that “it is important to develop some operational indicators of 
human security,” (UNDP, 1994, p. 3). However, because the scope of the report encompasses 
so many variables, it essentially becomes the jack of all policy trades and master of none. In 
fact, the most common critique of the 1994 report is that is too broad to be practical. The 
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arbitrary nature of the seven threat dimensions and an incoherent mechanism for measuring 
threats across these dimensions renders the report functionally inadequate (Alkire, 2003; 
Grayson, 2008; King & Murray, 2001). For example, when describing the economic 
component of human security, the report begins with a simple indicator: “Economic security 
requires an assured basic income” (UNDP, 1994, p. 25). Yet, instead of presenting a 
straightforward strategy for measuring this indicator and subsequently ensuring the 
protection of a “basic income,” the report points to employment, the job market, industry, 
credit and loan systems and the degradation of communities as sources for economic threats. 
By the end of the discussion of each of the seven dimensions of threat, we find ourselves no 
closer to operationalizing human security than we did in the report’s overview.  
A slightly more concise definition of human security is found in “A Conceptual 
Framework for Human Security.” Alkire (2003) posits that: “The objective of human security 
is to safeguard the vital core of all human lives from critical pervasive threats, in a way that 
is consistent with long-term human fulfillment” (p. 2). Disassembling this definition and 
examining its component parts offers a clearer understanding of the depth and breadth of this 
construction. There are five key terms in this definition: “safeguard,” “vital core,” “all human 
lives,” “critical and pervasive threats” and “human fulfillment.”  
The term “safeguard” requires institutions to actively engage in the protection of their 
populations. With this, possible threats must be identified and proper preparations put in 
place to mitigate the impacts of crises. Institutionalizing the responsibility for protection 
encourages respect for human security objectives—thus, resources that are meant to be used 
in the implementation and continuation of these policies will not be redirected (Alkire, 2003). 
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However, safeguarding against threats does not mean that the focus is shifted to a threat 
based analysis; the primary referent remains the individual.  
Alkire (2003) uses the term “vital core” to describe the scope of human security. 
Rather than covering every possible aspect of human living, the vital core concept implies 
security of fundamental basic human rights, capabilities and needs. “All human lives” 
emphasizes individuals as the foci of institutional activities. It is worth noting that this focus 
on the fundamental well-being of human lives does not imply or require institutions to adopt 
humanitarian motivations; it simply adjusts the emphasis of the security agenda from 
territorial integrity to the protection of the population.  
As mentioned earlier, effectively protecting human lives requires institutions to 
identify and actively prepare for threats. “Critical” threats degrade the vital core of humans. 
“Pervasive” threats refer to large scale and/or reoccurring threats. The important point is that 
critical and pervasive threats are capable of robbing a large number of people of basic rights 
and capacities. Part of the human security agenda is successfully acknowledging, preparing 
and responding to direct and indirect (e.g. structural violence) threats.  
Finally, “human fulfillment” addresses the sustainability of human welfare. Again, 
institutions are implicated in preserving the long-term good of the population. Effectively 
protecting the vital core of humans requires an institutional framework that considers both 
the current population as well as future generations.  
While I consider Alkire’s definition to be one of the most thoughtful and articulate 
embodiments of human security, Alkire (2003), like the authors of the “Human Development 
Report,” does not provide a concrete methodological framework for implementing her 
definition. Alkire (2003) proposes a qualitative analysis of “people’s reflections, on the basis 
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of their own experience and knowledge, of their values and needs” (p. 24). Rather than 
proffering a how-to manual for policy makers, Alkire (2003) contends that identifying the 
“vital core” of people should be specific to a state and, once these values and needs are 
identified, the state should respond with appropriate procedures.  
The 1994 “Human Development Report” and “A Conceptual Framework for Human 
Security” share two fundamental flaws. First, there is no rigorous methodology for assessing 
the current state of human security and so there is no way to gauge the effectiveness of the 
authors’ recommendations. Second, both of these definitions imply universality in the 
experiences of all humans. While these analyses identify gender, ethnicity, and social class as 
factors to consider for human security, they do not prioritize these distinctions.  As feminist 
scholars have repeatedly shown, if gender is not prioritized, women will fade into the 
margins (Enloe, 1989; Tickner, 1992). The same holds true for other non-privileged groups.  
A human security study that does employ a rigorous methodology is King and 
Murray’s (2000) “Rethinking Human Security.” The authors define an “individual’s human 
security as his or her expectation of years of life without experiencing the state of generalized 
poverty. Population security, then, is an aggregation of individuals’ human security” (King & 
Murray, 2000, p. 592). Crucial to this definition of security is the consideration of future 
risks and the demarcation of a specific threshold between security and insecurity. King and 
Murray (2000) argue that distinguishable differences in life experiences exist depending on 
which side of this threshold a person falls. Defined as such, security depends heavily on the 
presence or absence of poverty. In this particular case, poverty refers to the deprivation of 
any basic capability (King & Murray, 2000).  
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King and Murray (2000) include five metrics in the measurement of generalized 
poverty: income, health, education, political freedom and democracy. Notably, no one metric 
carries more weight than the others; if an individual falls below a certain threshold in any one 
of the domains, he or she is said to be in a state of generalized poverty. Each domain is 
assigned one particular indicator. Income poverty is indicated by Gross National Product 
(GNP) per capita converted into purchasing power parity. Any person or group subsisting on 
less than $365 per capita per year is said to be in a state of absolute economic poverty. Health 
security is measured on a 0 (death) to 1 (full health) scale; any person below .25 on this scale 
is said to be in a state of generalized poverty. Education is measured by average years of 
schooling; fewer than “five or six years” indicates a state of generalized poverty (King & 
Murray, 2000, p. 601). Political freedom draws on the Freedom House measures of societal 
freedoms, while the Democracy domain is indicated by the right of an individual to vote in at 
least one election.  
King and Murray (2000) use a complex statistical equation to compute likelihood of 
years outside of generalized poverty, based on the previously indicated domains.1 For 
example, if a 30 year-old woman has a life expectancy of 30 additional years but only a 50 
percent chance of living above the generalized poverty threshold, her individual human 
security score is 15 years. To determine the human security of an entire population, King and 
Murray (2000) find the average of the number of years of individual human security for 
everyone in a given population.  
King and Murray’s (2000) definition, while easily measured and observed, is too 
parsimonious and fails to consider security beyond the strict domains and indicators they 
identify. For example, it fails to consider perceived threats. It also fails to account for 
                                                          
1 For complete details of the statistical analysis see King and Murray (2000) p. 609. 
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structural biases that misrepresent the well-being of marginalized groups. For King and 
Murray (2000), human security and its measurements can only be conceived of within “those 
domains of well-being that have been important enough for human beings to fight over or to 
put their lives or property at great risk” (p. 593). I argue that, because males have been and 
continue to be the majority of the warriors and property holders2, King and Murray’s (2000) 
justification requires rewording thus: “those domains of well-being that men have deemed 
important enough to fight over or to put their property at risk.” Failing to consider how the 
chosen domains and indicators are pregnant with male dominated measures (i.e. right to vote 
versus ability to vote) produces a superficial picture of human security. Additionally, King 
and Murray’s (2000) definition gives no consideration to qualitative measures of security and 
insecurity that cannot be captured by purely quantitative analyses.  
Owen’s (2008) article, “Measuring Human Security,” brings in some of the 
qualitative data that King and Murray (2000) disregard. Owen (2008) defines human security 
as: “the protection of the vital core of all human lives from critical and pervasive economic, 
environmental, health, food, political and personal threats” (p. 53). It is obvious that Owen 
(2008) based his definition on those proposed by Alkire (2003) and the 1994 “Human 
Development Report.” However, his analysis of human security differs in a few key ways. 
Owen (2008) is the first to develop a methodology that “facilitates the collection, 
organization, and spatial analysis of human security information using a Geographic 
Information System (GIS)” (p. 53). Rather than relying on national statistics from various 
organizations, Owen (2008) takes a subnational approach to data collection that uses spatial 
references as the common denominator. First, threats are assessed by interviewing regional 
                                                          
2 See the 1995 “Human Development Report” for an in-depth comparison of male versus female property 
holders. For a discussion of women in militaries see Enloe (2007) Globalization and Militarism. 
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experts in each of the six categories (i.e. economic, environmental, health, food, political and 
personal threats). This serves to filter the extensive list of threats down to those that are 
relevant to a specific region. Next, quantitative and qualitative data related to the determined 
threats must be collected (ideally by contacting the regional experts referenced earlier). Two 
key factors come into play here: the data must have a spatial component and must be 
available. Once the datasets for each threat are collected, they are organized in a GIS by their 
spatial reference. Finally, maps that reflect the specific threat and the severity of that threat 
are produced. Those areas with numerous severe threats are dubbed “hotspots” and reveal the 
areas with the greatest threats to human security.  
Both intriguing and methodologically elegant, Owen’s (2008) measurement is a fine 
starting place for merging the methodological rigor of King and Murray (2000) with the rich 
qualitative assessments of the 1994 “Human Development Report” and Alkire (2003). Still, 
Owen’s approach falls short. His approach relies on a network of “local researchers, the 
NGO community, government ministries, and international organizations” (Owen, 2008, p. 
55) to establish the severity of threats in a community. Owen does not specifically require 
experts who are sensitive to threats faced by women, threats faced by ethnic classes or threats 
arising from class imbalances. This is the common downfall of all four of these approaches. 
By failing to address the inherent power imbalances between men and women and across 
ethnic and class divides, researchers risk assessing threats of a population rather than threats 
in a population.  
The 1995 “Human Security Report” examined the state of women in the world and 
found that in no society do women enjoy a greater level of human development than men 
(UNDP, 1995). This suggests that the individual experiences of women should take a central 
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position in the evaluation of security if the end goal is the improvement of the daily lives of 
most people. Thus, I propose a feminist-based approach to defining and measuring human 
security that foregrounds gender, ethnicity and class. Feminists have long decried the 
inadequacy of analyzing aggregate populations and drawing “comprehensive” conclusions 
that claim to reflect the people of the state. Feminist scholarship is born out of lived 
injustices; thus, feminists are sensitive to security differences based not only on gender, but 
on race, sexual orientation, ethnicity and class as well (Basch, 2004; Hudson, 2005).  
A feminist based definition will provide the world not only with a more equitable 
framework for practically applying human security but also for studying human security. 
Feminist researchers demand an awareness of every aspect of the research process that is not 
found in other approaches. The feminist research ethic requires researchers to be acutely 
aware of the power of epistemology, boundaries and relationships (Ackerly & True, 2008). 
This critical self-reflection requires a constant appraisal of techniques and findings (Enloe, 
1989). I criticize the current measurements of human security because they fail to meet the 
standards of the feminist research ethic; not one of the aforementioned methodologies 
questions the way researchers inquire about human security.  
I propose the following feminist-based definition of human security: Human security 
ensures basic sustenance, existential protection and confidence in the stability of these basic 
guarantors of well-being by examining critical and pervasive threats to individuals across 
gender, race/ethnicity and class lines.  
There are essentially three parts to this definition: what human security protects (basic 
guarantors of well-being), what threatens human security (critical and pervasive threats) and 
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how to examine human security within a society (individuals delineated by gender, 
race/ethnicity and class).  
 “Ensuring basic sustenance” means that individuals have access to means of 
sustaining life and livelihood. In other words, individuals are guaranteed to have adequate 
food and clean drinking water. “Existential protection” means that individuals do not fear for 
their survival—whether in the public or the private sphere. These two concepts are mutually 
reinforcing; having access to food and water while still fearing for one’s life is not adequate 
security. “Confidence in the stability of these guarantors” means that individuals cannot 
foresee that either their basic sustenance or existential protection will be drastically 
compromised due to inadequacies, biases or changes within the state system.  
To identify the threats to human security, I build on Alkire’s (2003) definitions of 
critical and pervasive threats. To reiterate, critical threats threaten a person’s basic 
capabilities and functions. A critical threat does not have to occur suddenly; what makes a 
threat “critical” is its depth. Pervasive threats are those threats that are widespread and/or 
reoccurring. Widespread does not mean that the same threat impacts a vast number of people 
(e.g., a tsunami); a woman may be beaten in her home with no community organization or 
state mechanism for reprisal against perpetrator. While this may seem as if the threat is 
limited to the woman in question, count the occurrences of domestic violence within a state 
and it becomes clear that the domestic violence threat is pervasive. Critical and pervasive 
threats can be direct or indirect; ethnic cleansing and water contamination both directly 
threaten the lives of individuals. Alkire (2003) and Enloe (1989) point out how 
overinvestment in military sectors causes underinvestment in social sectors such as education 
or healthcare. This rerouting of funds indirectly threatens the well-being of individuals.  
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As indicated by the feminist literature, aggregate analyses of populations are 
inadequate. Parsing out differences by gender, race/ethnicity and class dimensions will 
successfully identify specific threats experienced by specific groups. Human security must be 
analyzed locally; national-level data misses the nuances of interactions at personal and 
community levels. While there will obviously be overlap between the dimensions, each will 
provide a different perspective. By then comparing the different perspectives a complete, 
nuanced account of individual level threats will emerge. Furthermore, having three 
perspectives will uncover patterns of insecurity within the dimensions. A simple example is 
this: If being poor, being black and being a woman are all correlated with having poor access 
to clean drinking water in a certain locality, then it would make sense to focus on improving 
basic resources to all poor, black women in that area.  
Case Selection—The Kingdom of Jordan  
In a tumultuous region, Jordan stands as a stalwart of stability. In a conventional 
sense, the Kingdom is secure. However, examining particular enclaves of the population 
reveals groups of people who experience insecurity on a daily basis. This has far reaching 
ramifications; choosing a case where insecurity is unexpected—and finding numerous 
examples—calls for an examination of other “secure” countries. Conceiving of security in 
this manner requires a fundamental change in our understanding of security around the 
world. 
I use three categories to investigate the security status of women in Jordan: political 
security, social security and economic security. Given the interrelatedness of these sectors, 
some overlap will inevitably occur. However, to fully appreciate the security and insecurity 
of Jordanian women, a temporary disaggregation of these factors is necessary. In my final 
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chapter, I revisit the overlaps and disconnects among these categories and argue that human 
security can be improved only when we address certain inadequacies in Jordan. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 
 
CHAPTER 2—POLITICAL SECURITY 
Scholars cite the opening of Jordan’s political system in the form of free and fair 
elections in 1989 as one of the defining factors responsible for the increase in women’s 
political involvement in the Kingdom (Alatiyat & Barari 2010; Roald 2009). In the following 
decades, Jordanian women began to enter the political system—starting with the election of 
Toujan Faysal to the lower house of parliament in 1993. While Faysal won a seat allocated to 
ethnic Circassians, not an at- large seat, she still broke new ground for women in Jordan. 
Unfortunately, it would be a decade before the election of another woman into parliament; in 
2003, the establishment of a quota system allocated six of the 110 seats in the lower house to 
women. In 2010, the total seat number increased to 120 and the number allocated to women 
was raised to twelve, thus ensuring female representation from each of Jordan’s 12 
governorates (Alatiyat & Barari 2010). Most recently, a proposed new electoral law would 
increase the total number of seats from 120 to 138 and give women another three seats in 
parliament (Ryan, 2012).  
On the surface, it seems that Jordanian women are poised and ready to enter en masse 
the political scene within the Kingdom. Scrutinizing the literature and data on female 
political participation, however, reveals the tenuous role women still maintain in Jordanian 
politics. The following sections outline the ever-changing role of women in political parties, 
organizations and governmental positions.
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Women, Political Engagement and Islamists 
The ending of martial law in 1991 and subsequent legalization of political parties 
ushered in a new group of people to the Jordanian parliament. No other group beside the 
Muslim Brotherhood (MB)—not technically a political party—escaped the political party ban 
in place between 1957 and 1991. In 1992, the MB created a political party through which the 
Islamists could run for office, the Islamic Action Front (IAF). In subsequent parliamentary 
elections, the IAF dominated. The MB’s political wing won 22 seats making them the largest 
single parliamentary coalition (Ababneh, 2009). 
A number of scholars question whether or not Islamists promote or suppress women’s 
involvement in politics. Clark and Schwedler (2003) note that the IAF includes women in the 
highest decision-making bodies. Given the seemingly privileged position of women in the 
party, the IAF—at first glance—appears sympathetic to and even proactive in the promotion 
of women in politics. However, the mere presence of women does not a female-friendly 
organization make; women in the IAF assumed greater roles within the organization for 
strategic purposes primarily. When the image of the IAF does not reflect public opinion on 
women’s issues, women within the organization gain admittance into perceived positions of 
power to improve the appearance of gender relations and to appease critics (Clark & 
Schwedler, 2003).  
The IAF, despite the façade, fails to integrate women into the power structure in any 
meaningful way. Party leaders contend that Islam requires justice for women, rather than 
equality (Alatiyat & Barari, 2010). Heralding this stance, the Islamists created a parallel 
women’s sector to, theoretically, mirror the multi-sectored main political party. 
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Constitutionally, the women’s sector has the same objectives as the primary party; yet in 
practice, the women’s sector predominantly serves as a female-recruiting entity, especially 
during crucial voting sessions (Clark & Schwedler, 2003). In short, ebbs and flows in 
Jordan’s political climate act as a catalyst for change. Because the IAF lacks both a clear 
policy for and ideological stance on the advancement of women, leaders oppress or empower 
women as a reaction to state policies addressing gender issues. As such, change is 
impermanent (Alatiyat & Barari, 2010; Clark & Schwedler, 2003).  
IAF reactions to the changing role of women in Jordanian communities have 
improved the conditions for women within the IAF.  Female IAF members report favorable 
changes in their lives resulting from their membership. Most importantly, in-depth Quranic 
knowledge elevates women’s self-perceptions (Ababneh, 2009). As Quranic scholars, the 
women feel personal empowerment, challenge oppressive norms and traditions and garner 
greater respect from the community. Political activism allows women to attain more practices 
of freedom and choice within daily power relations. Ababneh (2009) further argues that by 
assuming the role of a “religious scholar,” women’s social positions improve and pave the 
way for greater involvement in other sectors.  
Notably, Jordanian cultural norms still intimately tie women to the male members of 
their family; female empowerment is embedded in familial contexts. Membership in political 
organizations, specifically the IAF, is generally contingent upon approval from a male family 
member. Moreover, in Jordan, familial honor rests squarely on the shoulders of women. 
Understanding womanhood in this manner directly impacts the options women have for 
movement, involvement, education and so forth. Patriarchal power, then, constrains women 
before and after their entrance into political organizations (Ababneh, 2009).   
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Joining the IAF impacts a woman on two fronts: as a member of the organization and 
as a member of Jordanian society at large. Some female IAF members report a decrease in 
personal security because of their political involvement. Perhaps the most serious affront to 
personal well-being is the fear of increased governmental surveillance of their daily actions. 
This increase in governmental surveillance condemns women to even more marginal 
positions in society; potential employers associate IAF members with security issues and 
immediately reject the members from employment. Employers are not alone in their 
shunning of IAF participants; politically inactive women distance themselves from politically 
active females for fear of being associated with the IAF (Ababneh, 2009).   
Women’s Organizations and Politics 
The IAF is not the only organization that must react and adapt to societal rifts; indeed, 
vibrant and vociferous women’s groups can change the agenda of parliament as well as direct 
the conversation of Islamists (Alatiyat & Barari, 2010). When women have the option to 
mobilize, they have the opportunity to effectively foreground the concerns of women (Al-Ali, 
2003). Jordanian women’s organizations struggle to defend political spaces where civil 
society can flourish.  
Given the implicit power of civil society, the state is intimately involved with 
women’s non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The creation of Royal NGOs (RONGOs) 
and semi-governmental NGOs (note the oxymoron) moderate the activities of activists 
(Brand, 1998; Wiktorowicz, 2002). Indeed, some argue that “civil society institutions are 
more an instrument of state control than a mechanism of collective empowerment” 
(Wiktorowicz, 2000, p. 43). Independent NGOs must submit license applications and 
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detailed reports of all activities to the government. Resultantly, relatively few women’s 
NGOs are politically oriented (Brand, 1998). Channeling the focus of the population requires 
a platform and funding; donors expect results and, usually, publicity. RONGOs, by 
definition, have the support of the royal family, the most money and resources and attract 
donor dollars with their impressive track record of involvement. Should women’s NGOs 
choose to “go underground” they effectively lose their platform. Thus, groups seeking to 
impact parliament inevitably interact with the state (Clark & Young, 2008).  
 State involvement in NGOs has not completely squelched the goals of the women’s 
movement. In fact, involvement with NGOs encourages the political activity of women 
outside of the walls of parliament. The Women for Women Network, created in 2006 by the 
National Institute for International Affairs (NDI), unites women’s organizations, 
parliamentarians, members of municipal courts and political parties and activists for the 
purpose of promoting female candidates for elected offices (NDI, n.d.). The Arab Women’s 
Organization, along with representatives from the Al Mosawa Network (a conglomerate of 
more than 80 grassroots women’s organizations) document breaches of women’s rights, 
cases of violence against women and violations of international conventions—namely the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). 
The combined efforts of these activists culminated in a 2007 report to CEDAW on the 
national policies, measures and figures on violence against women (Naffa, Al Dabbas, Jabiri 
& Al Emam, 2007). The Jordanian Women’s Union along with more than 20 other NGOs 
prepared an updated CEDAW report in 2012; the report makes recommendations to the 
Jordanian CEDAW compliance committee on issues such as trafficking in women and 
21 
 
prostitution, public and political involvement of women, equality before the law and the 
rights and protection of refugee women (Al-Jabiri, 2012).  
Increasing awareness of women’s issues, no matter the source, provokes societal 
discourses on these issues. Using the IAF as a proxy, correlations can be made between the 
demands of constituents (e.g., women’s work, education and political participation) and 
concessions of Islamists. Alatiyat and Barari’s (2010) analysis of Islamists and the women’s 
movement concluded that, by politically engaging Islamist political parties, the women’s 
movement successfully instigated a change in regard to women’s roles in society. In fact, 
“the more aggressive the debate on women’s rights…the more effect it had” on Islamist’s 
political agendas (Alatiyat & Barari, 2010, p. 377).  
Women in Government 
Surveying the recent activity of women in government reveals the instability of 
women’s political positions (see Table 1). From 2008 to 2010, the percentage of females 
appointed to ministerial positions dropped by more than four percentage points. Meanwhile, 
the number of females appointed the upper house of parliament decreased from 12.7% in 
2008 to 10.9% in 2009 but then increased to 15% in 2010. As expected, doubling the number 
of seats allocated to women in the lower house of parliament significantly raised the number 
of women MPs in 2010. In short, women lack consistency in their involvement in the 
majority of government positions.  
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Table 1. Percentage of Females in Government Positions 
 
2008 2009 2010 
The Cabinet 14.3 14.3 9.7 
The Upper House of Parliament 12.7 10.9 15 
The Lower House of Parliament 6.4 6.4 10.8 
Local Councils 27.4 27.4 24.8 
Source: Jordan Department of Statistics,2011 
   The appointment of Ina’am Al Mufti as the Minister of Social Development in 1979 
marked the first time a woman ever held a cabinet position. Her appointment preceded the 
first election of a woman into the lower house by nearly a decade and a half (Attar, 2007). It 
seems counterintuitive then, that women in the lower house of parliament now regularly 
outnumber the female cabinet members. Reformers lament this trend and cite the fleeting and 
random presence of women in the Prime Minister’s cabinet as evidence of women’s 
transitory place in politics (Elbatran, 2010).  
Interestingly, in 2010 women accounted for only 15% of the upper house of 
parliament but political parties had nearly 30% female participation that year (Jordan 
Department of Statistics). Even more telling, Abla Abu Olba was the first woman to be 
appointed secretary general of a political party, the Democratic People’s Party (or Hash’d), 
and is currently serving as an MP for Amman’s first district (NDI, 2010). Leftist parties are 
well-known for their promotion of women in politics. As such, many women who are 
registered as “independent” closely identify with leftist parties (Al-Attiyat, Shteiwi & 
Sweiss, 2003; Elbatran, 2010).  
The low number of women in governmental positions does not reflect a lack of 
interest on the part of women (see Table 2). Although 65 fewer female candidates ran for 
election in 2010 compared to 2007, the number is still considerably higher than previous 
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election years. Structural and sociocultural barriers discourage many women from attempting 
to run for parliament in the first place.  A lack of financial resources, a distrust of women 
performing in a “man’s field” and the one-person, one-vote system are but a few of the 
constraining factors for women seeking political office (Husseini, 2010). A quote from a 
female parliamentary candidate in 2010 exemplifies the societal resistance: “Society is not 
prepared yet for women in parliament. Both men and women told me, ‘What do you want 
with this headache? If male parliamentarians hardly did anything in their posts, how can 
women do anything then?’” (as cited in Ma’Yeh, 2010).  
Table 2 Female Participation in Lower House of Parliament  
Year  1989 1993 1997 2003 2007 2010 
Number of Female Candidates 12 3 17 54 199 134 
Number of Females Elected Outright 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Number of Females Elected through Quota 0 1* 0 6 6 12 
Source: Attar, 2007; Azzi, 2007; Husseini, 2010 
*Toujan Faysal elected through the quota for Circassians, not the gender quota.  
 
According to the literature and data, women regularly serve in the margins of political 
groups despite displaying great capability at enacting change through civil society. 
Attempting to establish long-term security for women requires a change in the perception of 
women’s political skills and a system that encourages and provides for women in halls of 
government.  
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CHAPTER 3—SOCIAL SECURITY 
Social security is a complex and often misunderstood blend of legal, cultural and 
socioeconomic factors. Uncovering the root causes of women’s insecurity in everything from 
domestic violence and honor killings to providing for their families requires an examination 
of the legalities that can curb or perpetuate these issues.  
Legal Policies Addressing Women’s Rights 
Article 1.6 of the Jordanian Constitution states: “All Jordanians are equal before the 
law in rights and obligations, without distinction as to race, language or religion” (as cited in 
Roald 2009, p. 46). “All Jordanians” encompasses both men and women, allegedly 
guaranteeing equality before the law. Despite constitutional protection and prioritization of 
parity between genders, barriers to women’s political and social participation still exist. 
Some scholars contend that because the constitution fails to explicitly denote equality on the 
basis of sex, “gender blindness” occurs among policy makers (Roald, 2009, p. 46). This 
blindness is made manifest in three particular cases: the ratification of CEDAW (and the 
reservations to certain Articles), the Provisional Election Law of 2010 and Personal Status 
Laws. These distinct yet interrelated cases highlight the complex relationship between the 
monarchy, parliament and women.  
 In a perpetually globalizing world, international organizations have the capability to 
influence state policies (Barnett & Finnemore 2004, Sikkink 2011). Dababneh (2012) argues 
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that Jordanian policies have, in fact, been affected by international conventions—especially 
CEDAW—but these fail to transfer into substantial effects on the daily lives of women. 
When Jordan ratified CEDAW, the committee did so with certain reservations: Ariticle 9, 
paragraph 2 and Article 16, paragraph 1 (c), (d) and (g) (United Nations, n.d.) Article 9, 
paragraph 2 grants women the same right as men with respect to the nationality of their 
children. Article 16, paragraph 1(c) ensures the same rights and responsibilities for men and 
women during and upon the termination of a marriage. Paragraphs (d) and (g) of that same 
article confirm equal rights and responsibilities—irrespective of marital status—in matters 
relating to their children and equal personal rights (e.g., choosing a family name, a profession 
and an occupation), respectively (United Nations, n.d.). Given the enshrinement of equality 
for “All Jordanians” in the constitution, why do these reservations about particular CEDAW 
Articles arise? 
The reservation to Article 9 is particularly contentious. Jordanian women’s inability 
to pass their nationality to their children spurs heated debates around the country. In February 
2012, women’s rights groups—spearheaded by Nimat Habashneh—threatened to protest 
outside of the Prime Minister’s office every week until the Citizenship Law changed 
(McGinley, 2012). Parliamentarians argue that politics drive this policy, rather than a desire 
to subjugate women. According to these members, granting Jordanian citizenship to children 
with Palestinian fathers would decrease the number of Palestinian citizens and the push for a 
Palestinian state would lose its fervor (Roald, 2009).  Jordanian women, however, deal with 
the burden of acquiring security clearances, permits for residency and medical reports for 
their “non-Jordanian” children. Even more troublesome, Jordanian women must pay JD40 
for children to attend a government school and, upon graduation, non-Jordanians must pay 
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JD270 to obtain a work permit (Husseini, 2012c; Husseini, 2012f). Despite protests and 
condemnation of the Citizenship Law, parliamentarians continue to declare that “now is not 
the right time to give citizenship to the children of Jordanian women married to non-
Jordanians” (as cited in Husseini, 2012f).  
Many of the activists campaigning for the repeal of the Citizenship Law also call for 
the addition of “gender” to Article 6 of the constitution, which declares there can be no 
discrimination on the basis of race or religion. In 2011, the constitutional committee debated 
including “gender” in Article 6 but alleged political and religious constraints dissuaded the 
committee from making the change (Muasher, 2011). More recently, the Royal Committee 
on Constitutional Review assured activists that “gender” would be included in Article 6, but 
the final draft did not reflect their statements; this time, only “political” reasons were cited 
for the exclusion. Activists argue that continually upholding the current version of Article 6 
allows for gender discrimination, especially when the issue of citizenship arises in court 
(Husseini, 2012c). Moreover, CEDAW experts, in a February 2012 report, expressed 
concerns over the failure to recognize sex in the constitution; activists use this report to 
pressure the government to meet their demands (“Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination,” 2012; Husseini, 2012c). 
Understanding the complexity of the CEDAW debate requires a consideration of both 
monarchical and Islamist influences. Jordanian authorities signed the CEDAW agreement but 
did not discuss the Convention in parliament before the ratification was made public (Roald, 
2009). This highlights a dichotomy at work in Jordan: King Abdullah’s stance on women’s 
participation compared to that of the Islamists and conservatives in parliament. King 
Abdullah consistently emphasizes the need to increase the presence of women in all fields, 
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especially politics (Dababneh, 2012). However, the Hashemite leadership calls for increased 
involvement that still conforms to the social traditions and customs of Jordan. Hence, despite 
ratifying CEDAW without Islamist input, the Jordanian authorities simultaneously promote 
the heightened involvement of women in preapproved sections of the public sphere, while 
keeping women wholly subjugated in the domestic sphere. This ingrained structural bias 
often goes unchallenged; failing to critically evaluate the system is part of the reason women 
cannot enjoy full constitutional rights (Roald, 2009). 
With CEDAW originating in the UN, Islamists and traditionalists argue that the 
Convention imposes western conceptions of gender onto the Jordanian population. Islamists 
expound upon the notion that normalcy in Jordanian society hinges upon different social 
behaviors of men and women. CEDAW, Islamists argue, gives women full control over their 
bodies and, as such, women can engage in sexual relationships without religious or familial 
approval. Unchecked sexual behavior leads to moral decay and the inevitable demise of the 
family structure. Sexual freedom is linked to western secular ideals; a female IAF member of 
parliament (MP) argues that Jordanians “supersede the West by [their] strong familial bonds” 
(as cited in Alatiyat & Barari, 2010, p. 364). According to Islamists and other conservatives, 
removing all reservations to CEDAW would degrade every social more in Jordan; cultural 
identity would be sacrificed on the altar of western homogenization (Alatiyat & Barari, 
2010).  
Both the Constitution of Jordan (see Articles 22 and 23) and the King’s commitment 
to CEDAW oblige the state to ensure women’s participation in society and public duties, 
most notably participation in parliament (Dababneh, 2012).  Though many authors argue that 
women’s political participation in Jordan is still very low, current participation is 
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significantly greater than previous years (Roald, 2009).  The adoption of the quota system for 
women in parliament in 2003 dramatically increased women’s representation in the public 
domain. To reiterate an earlier point, only one woman succeeded in gaining a seat in 
parliament between the years 1989 and 2003. The 2010 Provisional Election Law improved 
upon the 2003 Provisional Election Law by increasing the number of parliamentary seats for 
women from six to twelve. Adding more seats for women serves a number of purposes: each 
of the twelve governorates in Jordan now have at least one female representative, female 
members of parliament more often address women’s issues and women in parliament can 
demand greater gender equality in other sectors (Dababneh, 2012; Jamal, 2010). 
Expectedly, the Provisional Election Law generated a number of critiques. As 
evidenced with CEDAW, delineating specific societal roles limits women’s involvement 
options to predetermined (and preapproved) sectors. MPs complain that women in parliament 
primarily undertake “service” concerns (e.g., securing food for poor or underfed families) 
and cannot fairly and adequately address all of the needs of their constituents. Ironically, 
male MPs often funnel service projects to women because social norms dictate women as 
caregivers (Jamal, 2010). Furthermore, even though elected women participate in parliament, 
they still must work within the confines of patriarchy; behaving too radically results in 
marginalization from other MPs. Even more importantly, voters re-elect members who 
maintain ties with political elites and can deliver goods to the constituency; hence, women in 
parliament “must participate in this system of patrimony, which privileges existing 
patriarchal networks” (Jamal, 2010, p. 12). Women, unfortunately, often become agents of 
the status quo rather than agents of change (Lust-Okar, 2006; Jamal, 2010).  
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Even though the number of women guaranteed in parliament doubled in 2010, 
authorities made no provisions for population differences between the governorates. 
Similarly, the 2012 reforms added three more seats to the women’s quota but, again, no 
considerations were made for governorate population differences (Clark & Young, 2008; 
Ryan, 2012). Clark and Young’s 2008 study found that the quota system did not significantly 
aid women in advocating for women’s rights. At that time, five of the six women who joined 
the 2003 parliament came from rural areas and the sixth was an IAF member.  Rather than 
promoting experienced, politically active women from Amman, critics claim that the quota 
system rewards socially conservative women who could secure the greatest percentage of 
votes in their electoral district (Clark & Young 2008; Husseini, 2010). The critics have some 
ground for speculation; only two women have secured parliament seats outright in Jordan, 
Falak Al-Jamaani in 2007 and Reem Badran in 2010. And Reem Badran is the only woman 
ever to win outright in Amman; she received 3,792 votes to earn one of the five seats for 
Amman’s District Three (Malkawi, 2010). Thus, the problem remains. The one-person, one-
vote system tends to prevent qualified women from large constituencies from winning seats 
and favors the election of less qualified and less politically active women from smaller sub-
districts (Beck & Collet, 2010). Under this system, “tribalism” dominates and proportional 
representation is forsaken (Ryan, 2010).  
The overarching patriarchy in the public sphere permeates the private lives of women. 
Personal Status Laws (PSLs) maintain polygamy, allow Sharia judges to marry girls between 
the ages of 15 and 18 and restrict women from requesting a divorce on demand (Clark & 
Young, 2008; Husseini, 2010). PSLs blatantly contradict the Jordanian Constitution (Brand, 
1998). In her 2003 work, Women of Jordan: Islam, Labor and the Law, Amira El-Azhary 
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Sonbol (2003) describes the magnitude of these laws: “The Personal Status Laws cannot be 
underestimated…As a totality, personal status laws confine women within predetermined 
patriarchal parameters, and give them only limited freedom of choice outside parental and 
husband approval” (p. 183).  No other case better represents the interconnectedness of the 
King, parliament, international organizations and women.  
Amendments to the PSLs reached parliament in 2003, with backing from domestic 
and international activists and the King and Queen. The parliament vehemently opposed the 
amendments. Pressure from civil society and international non-governmental organizations 
(INGO) consistently failed to convince the MPs, specifically the right-wing Islamist 
contingency, of the need and urgency for amending the PSLs (Brand, 1998; Clark & Young, 
2008).  
PSLs perpetuate women’s reliance on men. Inadequate, masculinized state structures 
tether women to male relatives and make self-sufficiency inconceivable (Jamal, 2010). 
Conjointly, social norms override the few protections that PSLs offer women. On paper, 
PSLs guarantee women the right to inheritance; in reality, women receive half the share of a 
male heir and families often pressure women to give that portion to their brothers (Al-Jabiri, 
2012; Brand 1998). The Seventh Annual Report of the National Center for Human Rights in 
the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan notes the disparity between law and reality:  
Despite the many legal reforms that have been incorporated in a number of 
existing legislation such as the Labor Law, Social Security Law…Personal 
Status Law, Protection from Domestic Violence Law… many of the 
discriminatory practices against women are still based on social norms and 
reveal systematic violence and discrimination against women. Some of them 
are considered criminal acts punishable by law, while others are justified in 
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society without any religious or legal basis. p. 60. The National Center for 
Human Rights, 2010. (Emphasis added)  
Without question, PSLs hinder the progression of women in Jordanian society. But, with 
PSLs and social norms dictating the appropriate level of engagement, how are women to 
overcome the barriers to entering the political and societal system?  
Personal Safety 
Any concept of social security must address the personal safety of women. The 
United Nations (UN) identifies three variations of violence experienced by women: gender 
based violence (GBV), violence against women (VAW) and domestic violence. UN reports 
define GBV as “violence that is directed at a person on the basis of gender or sex. It includes 
acts that inflect physical, mental or sexual harm or suffering, threats of such acts, coercion 
and other deprivations of liberty” (United Nations 2008, p. 8). VAW is “any act of gender 
based violence that results in, or is likely to result in physical, sexual and psychological harm 
to women and girls, whether occurring in private or public” (United Nations, 2008, p. 8). 
Finally, domestic violence is defined as “various behavioral patterns from a member of the 
family against other members, which directly or indirectly inflict psychological, physical, 
verbal or sexual harm” (United Nations, 2008, p. 8). Given the complexity of all three 
concepts of violence, no single institution can adequately address this issue (Abu Ghazaleh, 
2011). In Jordan, domestic violence is both pervasive and widespread and, as such, an 
analysis of personal safety should begin with an examination of this form of violence (Clark, 
2011).  
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Domestic Violence  
National reports of marital abuse range from approximately 30% to 50% (Al-Nsour, 
Khawaja & Al-Kayyali, 2009; Clark, 2011). In a 2009 study by Al-Nsour, Khawaja and Al-
Kayyali, 87% of women reported at least one form of abuse during the past year. Notably, 
this study found emotional abuse to be the most commonly reported form of violence (47.5% 
of women reported this form of abuse). A 2008 study from the Jordanian National Council 
for Family Affairs bolsters the aforementioned statistics; 60% of the survey respondents 
reported verbally abusing a family member and 40% responded as having physically abused 
a family member (United Nations, 2008). Such high numbers of reported abuse coincide with 
the prevailing notion that abuse is justifiable. In fact, in a 2011 survey, 87% of Jordanian 
women felt that wife beating was acceptable under at least one circumstance—usually 
infidelity on the part of the wife. Moreover, 69% of women believe that a woman 
disrespecting her husband or his family warrants physical abuse (Clark, 2011). 
Domestic violence has long term ramifications on a woman and her family structure. 
Victims of domestic abuse tend to have higher numbers of children and a greater risk for 
unwanted or unplanned pregnancies (Clark, 2011). Scholars link domestic violence to 
chronic diseases, depression and low levels of psychological well-being (Al-Modallal, 
Abuidhail, Sowan & Al-Rawashdeh, 2010; Hamdan-Mansour, Arabiat, Sato, Obaid & Imoto, 
2011). While pregnant, women carrying female fetuses reported more subtle types of abuse. 
Al-Akour (2007) found that women pregnant with male fetuses visited the doctor about nine 
times over the course of their pregnancy and women with female fetuses only had five doctor 
visits. Overt physical violence during pregnancy has been linked to societal pressures and 
husbands’ desires for male offspring (Okour & Badarneh, 2011). 
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Strategies for decreasing the prevalence of domestic abuse most often call for the 
empowerment of women. Empowering women involves providing educational opportunities 
and, most importantly, granting women financial independence. Women who have the option 
to take advantage of economic opportunities report fewer cases of domestic violence 
(Hamdan-Monsour, et al., 2011). Heightened participation in the local economy also tends to 
combat the social norms that encourage domestic abuse (Al-Nsour, Khawaja & Al-Kayyali, 
2009). Working women, who still bear the majority of domestic responsibilities, often have 
higher instances of depression. However, it is important to recognize that the depressive 
symptoms are a product of social and familial pressures rather than the job itself (Al-
Modallal, et al., 2010).  
Addressing Violence Against Women—Jordanian Initiatives 
The underlying causes of VAW can be traced to a number of factors (i.e., 
sociocultural pressures, inadequate economic opportunities, etc.) and, thus, no single 
institution can adequately address this issue (Abu Ghazaleh, 2011). Institutions across Jordan 
have coalesced in an effort to eradicate VAW. Jordanian laws created three national 
institutions tasked with protecting and safeguarding women:  the Jordanian National 
Commission for Women (JNCW), the National Council for Family Affairs (NCFA) and the 
National Center for Human Rights (NCHR).  Board members for each respective institution 
include governmental representatives, NGO staff members and subject experts. Domestic 
violence and abuse cases are investigated and addressed by a fourth national institution, the 
Family Protection Department—a sub-agency of the Public Security Directorate (United 
Nations, 2008). The combined efforts of these institutions result in a multi-faceted and 
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coherent task-force in charge of increasing social awareness of VAW, providing legal 
services for victims and, crucially, preventing VAW.  
The Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Justice, the 
Ministry of Social Development and the Ministry of Awqaf and Religious Affairs are the 
other major governmental organizations that address VAW. The Ministry of Health, with its 
network of health centers and hospitals, helps identify victims of domestic violence and 
sexual abuse. The Ministry of Education teaches school counselors how to recognize warning 
signs of abuse and helps students learn how to prevent violence. The Ministry of Social 
Development, while commonly regarded as a key organization in the struggle against VAW, 
actually has a limited arsenal for addressing the problem; most of the work done by this 
organization revolves around family counseling. The Ministry of Justice suggests laws and 
legislations that protect women. Finally, the Ministry of Awqaf and Religious Affairs, 
comprised of a network of religious figures, clarifies women’s rights in Islam and raises 
awareness on VAW in an Islamic context (United Nations, 2008).  
A dense network of NGOs work with the national institutions and ministries to lobby 
for legislative amendments (Jordanian Women’s Union), raise awareness of VAW 
(Sisterhood is Global Initiative, Arab Women’s Organization), engage in psychological and 
social counseling (Queen Zein El-Sharaf Institute for Development) and offer victim services 
(Jordan River Foundation, Institute for Family Health) (United Nations, 2008). The Private 
Sector Project for Women’s Health (PSP-Jordan) is a United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) funded initiative that has been especially successful in addressing 
VAW. PSP-Jordan helped establish the health clinic at the first women’s shelter in Jordan, 
Dar Alwifaq and also funded six NGOs in high risk communities all over the Kingdom to 
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help reach rural populations where VAW is especially high (USAID, 2010; Hamdan-
Mansour, et al. 2011).  
Honor Crimes 
A particularly heinous form of domestic violence, honor crimes are defined as “the 
killing of a woman by her relatives for violation of a sexual code in the name of restoring 
family honor” (Abu-Lughod, 2011, p. 17). Ongoing debates over perpetrators’ motivations 
for committing honor crimes most often point to tribal customs; the closer a culture is to its 
tribal roots, the more dominant the honor code (Abu-Lughod, 2011; Faqir, 2001; Kay, 2010). 
Overriding perceptions of the “honor code” in Jordan tie family honor to female behavior. In 
fact, a 2010 survey of over 2,000 households in Jordan found that 80.9% of parents believe 
that protecting a girl means protecting the family honor (Husseini, 2010). Behavior that 
deviates from socially constructed sexual norms, according to these people, shames the 
family; a family member (usually male) ends the life of the accused female in order to 
cleanse the family of the perceived shame (D’angelo, 2010; Hassan & Welchman, 2005). 
According to official records, approximately 20 honor crimes are committed annually in 
Jordan (Husseini, 2011c, Lichter, 2009). However, Rana Husseini, a journalist for the Jordan 
Times and the leading scholar on crimes of honor, believes that many crimes go unreported 
and the number could actually be doubled (Lichter, 2009).  
Despite common misconceptions, honor crimes are in no way connected to or 
supported by Islam (Abu-Lughod, 2011; Connors, 2005; Hamdan-Mansour, et al., 2011). The 
Chairman of the Islamic Group submitted a letter to the UN Secretary General and reiterated 
that fact: “There is no linkage whatsoever between the killing of women and girls under any 
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societal or communal behavior including passion, honor on race, and the teachings, practices 
and values of Islam” (as cited in Connors, 2005, p. 34). No religious affiliation has a 
monopoly on honor crimes; both internationally and in Jordan, reported cases involve 
Muslims, Christians and even Hindus (D’angelo, 2010; Kay, 2010).  
Activists and scholars contend that certain Jordanian laws promulgate honor crimes 
and create a culture of impunity for perpetrators (Hassan & Welchman, 2005; Human rights 
Watch, 2004). Articles 340, 98 and 99 of the Jordanian Penal Code receive the most scrutiny 
from activists. Article 340, which declares that surprising one’s wife “in the crime of adultery 
or in an unlawful bed” (in Hassan & Welchman, 2005) is a mitigating excuse for murder, has 
only been used once, however (Husseini, personal communication, April 21, 2012). Closely 
related to Article 340 is Article 98 which holds that: “Whosoever commits a crime in a state 
of extreme rage resulting from an unrightful and dangerous act on the part of the victim shall 
benefit from the mitigating/extenuating excuse” (Hassan & Welchman, 2005). Article 99 can 
also lessen a perpetrator’s sentence if the victim’s family chooses to excuse him or her 
(Husseini, 2011a; Husseini, 2011c; Husseini, 2012e).  
The government of Jordan, despite failing to rescind the aforementioned Articles, has 
made progress in stopping honor killings. For example, a 2009 special tribunal was 
established at the Criminal Court that bars perpetrators from using the “family honor” excuse 
(Husseini, 2011d). Since the establishment of this tribunal, Article 98 has not been applied to 
new cases (Husseini, personal communication, April 21, 2012).  Both the King and Queen 
vocally support grassroots organizations and NGOs committed to eliminating honor crimes.  
Jordanian civil society actively engages in awareness-raising initiatives aimed at changing 
social norms regarding crimes of honor. The “No Honor in Crime” campaign, founded by 
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Deena Dajani, visits high schools and universities to talk to students about honor crimes. 
Also, the group is currently collecting signatures calling for the elimination of Article 99 
(Husseini, 2011d). 
Perhaps more than any other group or individual, Rana Husseini captured the 
attention of the Kingdom—and the international community—and mobilized support for 
combating honor crimes; these efforts culminated in the creation of the National Jordanian 
Campaign to Eliminate So-Called Crimes of Honor in 1998. Through the efforts of this 
campaign, shelters have been established for honor crime victims and thousands of signatures 
have been collected to call for eliminating leniency clauses for perpetrators of honor crimes. 
Also, Husseini’s journalistic endeavors helped eliminate social taboos regarding these crimes 
and made it possible to discuss the topic in public forums (Lichter, 2009). 
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CHAPTER 4—ECONOMIC SECURITY  
“People need to study, need to work, if I am not economically secure I will be 
subjugated and under the mercy of the person who supports me” (as cited in Nemeh, 2010, p. 
324). The words of this Jordanian woman eloquently highlight the link between economic 
independence and security. Even though patriarchy permeates nearly every relationship in 
Jordan—social, political, economic, cultural—Jordanian women consistently cite economic 
security as the most important indicator for security. Indeed, financial independence boosted 
women’s feelings of empowerment, community respect and decreased instances of personal 
violence (Kawar, 2000; Nemeh, 2010).  
Beyond personal enrichment, numerous scholars and economists note how 
empowering women financially boosts the economy on both macro and micro scales (Kristof 
& WuDunn 2009; Sen, 2000; UNDP, 2011). In fact, the United Nations found a correlation 
between the advancement of women and economic growth. Conversely, countries that have 
little to no economic growth generally experience declining rates of development for women 
(UNDP, 2011). This fact has not gone unnoticed in Jordan. Jordan’s National Agenda (2005) 
calls for an “Increase [in] women’s contribution to the economy and [to] ensure that they 
become ‘partners’ with the men in the development process” (p. 13).  
Despite the findings and political rhetoric, the employment rate of women in Jordan 
lags behind world and regional averages (World Bank, 2012). The following sections further 
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explore the current state of women and the Jordanian economy, reveal the barriers to 
entering the workforce and highlight the disconnects between policies, attitudes and reality.  
Current State of Women and Economic Participation 
In the UNDP’s (2011) “Jordan Small Business and Human Development Report,” the 
authors found that “when considering the gender aspect, women fare worse all-round, not 
just on the [small and medium enterprise] scale but also at the national level” (p. 22). 
According to the World Bank (2012), the total population of Jordan is 6,047,000. 1,817,540 
Jordanians make up the labor force. Notably, females account for less than a quarter (22.9%) 
of the labor force. Working women are disproportionately employed in the public sector, 
even though the number of establishments in the private sector vastly outnumber those in the 
public sector (see Tables 3 and 4). This becomes especially problematic when considered in 
conjunction with the fact that the public sector was only able to absorb 41.4% of newly 
created jobs in 2008 and 82.5% of those jobs went to men (UNDP, 2011). Essentially, 
women vie for positions in an overly saturated public sector where they have minimal chance 
for advancement to the organization’s upper echelons. Viewed differently, women accounted 
for 35% of the total number of employees in the public sector in 2009. In the private sector 
that year, women only accounted for 18% of the employees. What makes this even more 
troubling is the fact that private establishments outnumber the public establishments 554 to 1.  
Poor advancement rates do not reflect the talent of the women in the labor force. 
Actually, the average Jordanian woman is more qualified than the average Jordanian man for 
similar jobs (Hendessi, 2007). In this regard, Jordan stands out in the region as one of only a 
few countries with a comprehensive educational system for both males and females. Average 
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women wage earners have 12.3 years of schooling while the average male wage earner only 
has 9.3 years of schooling (World Bank, 2012). Even though women have more education 
than their male counterparts, women make less money for the same jobs—in both the public 
and private sectors. In other words, women have to attain higher levels of education than men 
in order to obtain the same job for less money. By some estimates, the elimination of wage 
discrimination would increase women’s pay by 45% in the private sphere and by 13% in the 
public sphere (Hendessi, 2007). 
Table 3. Establishments and Employees*, Public Sector Years 2007-2009 
 
2007 2008 2009 
Establishments 260 256 266 
Employees-
Total 269529 282378 295755 
Male  176289 184711 191927 
Female 93240 97667 103828 
Source: Jordan Department of Statistics, 2011 
*Jordanian Nationality only 
   
Table 4. Establishments and Employees*, Private Sector Years 2007-2009 
  2007 2008 2009 
Establishments 146914 147327 147469 
Employees 497489 519348 540148 
Male  408539 424038 443500 
Female 88950 95310 96648 
Source: Jordan Department of Statistics, 2011 
*Jordanian Nationality only 
 
An often overlooked paradox exists within the education system. First, “‘disciplined’ 
gender politics in education, [perpetuate] traditional discursive practices, roles and 
stereotypes instead of acting as an emancipatory power” (Al-Mahadin, 2004, p. 22). Failing 
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to critique pedagogical practices and lesson plans has the potential to veil the biases that the 
system sustains (Al-Mahadin, 2004; Hendessi, 2007). Second, women need to learn practical 
skills for proactive job searches. Textbooks currently reinforce traditional gender roles and 
neglect training women on how to successfully venture into the working world (Hendessi, 
2007; Miles, 2002).  
With an average unemployment rate of 15%, lack of work is a serious issue for both 
men and women in Jordan. However, disaggregating the statistics reveals that women’s rates 
of unemployment are much higher (24.1%) than men (10.3%). What’s even more compelling 
is that approximately 55% of unemployed women have a Bachelor’s degree; that’s more than 
three times as high as unemployed men with degrees (UNDP, 2011). While Jordanian 
initiatives have successfully narrowed the education gap between males and females, changes 
to labor force participation have been slow (Al-Khaldi, 2006). As previously mentioned, 
Jordan’s National Agenda acknowledges the need to incorporate women into the economy. 
Unfortunately, there is no clearly defined strategy for achieving this inclusion. Without a 
strident commitment to changing the status quo, gender parity seems unlikely.  
Barriers to Labor Force Participation 
The 1970s and 1980s saw a rapid increase in women’s economic participation rates in 
Jordan. Changes in the market, coupled with supportive policies in the public sector 
produced an amenable environment for women to enter the workforce. While this evolution 
seemed promising for a few years, economic downturns shifted the winds of progress to 
disfavor women entering the economic realm. It became apparent that the temporary shift 
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reflected an economic need rather than a fundamental change in thinking (Brand, 1998; 
Hijab, 1988; Miles, 2002; Sonbol, 2003).  
Sociocultural ideations of women’s societal roles are generally regarded as the 
biggest barrier to women joining the labor force (Al-Mahadin, 2004; Kawar, 2000; Miles 
2002; Sonbol, 2003). Misogynist thinker Abbas Mahmud al-Aqqad sums up the female 
stereotype in three points: “1. Her nature, which includes her [physical] capabilities, and her 
[inherent] ability to serve her sex and her people. 2. Her rights and duties with the family and 
society. 3. Social relations that are required by custom and public morality most of which are 
matters of traditions and manners” (as cited in Sonbol, 2003, p. 219). Assessing these claims 
as a whole, we discover that the stereotypes stem from either individual biases (the nature of 
a woman) or structural biases (social duties and traditional expectations). These stereotypes 
are mutually reinforcing; preconceived notions about a woman’s “nature” are bolstered by 
cultural norms.  
Familial honor and community cohesion are linked to feminine modesty. Although 
women are responsible for shouldering the honor of a family, “the centrality of the family in 
perpetuating unequal power relations between men and women cannot be overestimated” 
(Kawar, 2000, p. 64). Females are cyclically dependent on male relatives. As young children 
and unmarried adolescents, females depend on their parents. Once married, women depend 
on their husbands (Kawar, 2000). The role of women is socially constructed in such a way 
that autonomy and empowerment are superseded by male superiority. Both men and women 
grow up with certain expectations of acceptable behaviors for both sexes. Some people link 
gender expectations with Islamic teachings, but, in reality, Jordanian traditions originated in 
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the tribal areas. Thus, the restraints on women’s mobility are tribal based and confused with 
Islam; Islam is used to validate these imbalanced power relations (Sonbol, 2003). 
What constitutes “approved female behavior” becomes apparent when examining the 
patterns of women’s movement in relation to their work and the simultaneous expectations 
about women in the workplace. Women are expected to work near their home, return home 
before dark and only work in a single-sex environment (Hendessi, 2007; Kawar, 2000; 
UNDP, 2011). Expectations about how and when women can work limit the options women 
have for employment. 20% of male business owners cite women’s inability to work late 
hours as the primary problem for hiring a female. 25% of the interviewed managers said the 
primary problem with hiring a female is her family’s refusal to let her work (UNDP, 2011).  
Structural discrimination creates even more adverse conditions for women’s entry 
into the labor force. The system provides no incentives for women to work. If a woman dies, 
her social security or pension will not be passed on to her husband or children. Also, women 
have a lower mandatory retirement age than men. While this was originally designed to 
protect women, it inadvertently harmed women, forcing them to leave their job five years 
before men robs them of additional years for contributing to their security fund (Hendessi, 
2007). Additionally, women are expected to resign upon marriage. If a woman resigns, she 
can withdraw all of the money she contributed to her retirement fund. Also, when a woman 
marries she receives a bonus comparable to an end of service bonus one receives upon 
retirement (Sonbol, 2003).  
Expectations about women’s roles after marriage lead to predictable outcomes. 
Because women typically leave the workforce upon marriage, managers do not extend 
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training opportunities to most women. Instead, men are awarded the opportunities to build 
their skillsets. Men also receive greater training because women’s wages are viewed as 
merely supplementary to that of her husband (Hendessi, 2007; UNDP, 2011). Managers 
engage in a cost-benefit analysis of male versus female employees; men can work longer—
both daily and over the course of a career—and have greater autonomy in society. The 
prevailing tendency to choose men over women is especially noticeable in the male 
dominated private sector. Regulations on private companies require provisions for female 
employees that further dissuade managers from hiring women (Table 5).  
Table 5. Public and Private Sector Employment  
Labor requirements  Public sector  Private sector  
Minimum wage  120 JD/month 85 JD/month 
Working hours  7 hours  8 hours  
Tenure  Security of tenure  Contractual  
Paid maternity leave  90 days  70 days  
Costs covered by  Government  Private sector employer  
Lactation leave  None prescribed  1 hour per day  
Nursery care  None prescribed  Fully funded on-site once 
20 married women are 
employed 
Source: Hendessi, 2007 
While marriage can hinder women’s roles as employees, it can aid women as business 
owners. In fact, 87% of female business owners report that being married has a positive 
effect on their business. Although this may seem counter-intuitive initially, it ultimately 
makes sense because having a family and a husband gives a woman the financial support and 
moral legitimacy to engage in a business pursuit. As a comparison, only 27% of female 
business owners felt that being single positively affected their business (Al-Alak & Al-
Haddad, 2010).  
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Disconnects in the Literature 
With the plethora of data available on women’s labor force participation in Jordan, it 
is not surprising that some statistics and reports seem contradictory. Moving forward, 
however, requires finding and rectifying the disparities.  
Nearly all of the aforementioned literature (see Barriers to Labor Force Participation 
section) cited cultural norms and social attitudes as one of the root causes hindering women 
from employment. Yet, the 2006 Arab Barometer found that 79.9% of Jordanians agreed that 
a married woman can work outside of the home if she wishes and 77.8% of Jordanians 
agreed that men and women should receive equal wages and salaries (Braizat, 2006). If the 
vast majority of surveyed individuals support women working outside of the home and 
women earning equal pay, why doesn’t reality reflect these attitudes?  
A more concrete manifestation of rhetoric versus reality can be found in the push 
towards privatization. The Center for Strategic Studies (CSS) and the Carnegie Middle East 
Center hosted a workshop in 2007 regarding economic reform in Jordan. Jamal al-Jibri from 
USAID, one of the primary sources of foreign financial assistance to the Kingdom, argued 
that privatization is a cornerstone of economic reform. Furthermore, al-Jibri contended that 
“Privatization has transformed formerly state-owned firms into dynamic private sector 
corporations. The privatization process has had a net positive impact on the number of jobs 
in Jordan” (CSS, 2007, no page number, emphasis added). The question remains, who 
received these jobs? Reviewing the number of males versus females employed in the private 
sector (see Table 2) shows that women are consistently underrepresented. Without question, 
the shrinking public sector disproportionately affects women (Miles, 2002).  
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Examining the findings and practical advice issued from the CSS (located in Amman) 
reveals a trend: women are rarely considered. CSS’ (2007) Economic Reform Strategy never 
mentions increasing women’s participation in the economy. Likewise, the “2002 Economic 
Integration in the Arab Mashreq Countries Phase II (The Private Sector) Analytical Report,” 
also issued by the CSS, neither acknowledges nor offers any recommendations for mitigating 
women’s low labor force participation.  
Integrating women into the economy requires a united effort. Women recognize that 
security is inextricably linked to economic independence. Furthermore, the Kingdom 
recognizes the potential women have for positively transforming the economy. Strategies for 
economic reform cannot overlook women nor can the gender disparity between public and 
private sectors continue to be ignored.  
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CHAPTER 5—CONCLUSION  
The Jordan case is important and useful for drawing conclusions about other Middle 
Eastern and Northern African countries. Policymakers should be aware of how legislations 
might not produce the intended results. Conceptualizing the security of Jordanian women 
from a feminist perspective prioritizes the experiences of these women and highlights 
disconnects between political rhetoric, public policies and economic realities. International 
norms push for gender mainstreaming but failing to consult women before initiating policies 
will only instigate superficial changes. Deconstructing the degree of political, social and 
economic involvement of Jordanian women revealed the areas where women suffer most and 
the areas where women prosper.  
Politically, women in Jordan walk a fine line between serving their constituencies, 
their parties and themselves. Many of the women in parliament produce impressive results 
and have phenomenal resumes and qualifications; they are testament to the quality of 
education and critical thinking found in Jordan. However, two glaring security issues arise: 
first, women active in political parties—especially opposition parties—worry about increased 
governmental surveillance of their movement. Second, such a small number of women 
actually enter the political machine that vast swaths of the women in the country will, 
realistically, never have the opportunity to participate in sanctioned political activities. True, 
NGOs and women’s organizations provide outlets for women to engage in politics but 
constant state observation moderates any radical thoughts. Thus, the paradox emerges: 
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Women engaged in political opposition parties fear the government and women attempting to 
change politics must succumb to the government.  
Socially, women are subject to discriminatory laws and norms that tether them to 
male relatives. Denying a woman the right to pass her nationality on to her children further 
exacerbates the issue of choosing the “proper” man to marry; undue burdens await those who 
choose non-Jordanian husbands. VAW and honor crimes are critical and pervasive threats to 
a large number of women. The interrelatedness of politics and security emerges; laws that 
promulgate a culture of impunity for perpetrators of VAW and honor crimes are so ingrained 
in the patriarchal system that those seeking reform must deal with allegations ranging from 
representing Western agendas to threatening the moral fabric of the entire Kingdom. 
Meanwhile, women in insecure situations continue to suffer while policymakers debate legal 
and Quranic semantics.  
Economically, women suffer the greatest but have the most to gain. Before a woman 
can enter politics she needs financial stability. Curbing VAW is linked to financial 
independence. Not surprisingly, economic reform proceeds at a glacial pace. Unleashing the 
potential of the educated mass of women in Jordan would, without doubt or reservation, 
fundamentally change the power structure in Jordan. Moving forward in any sector requires 
moving forward economically.  
These findings are useful to the myriad NGOs and INGOs working in Jordan. 
Allocating funds to economic development would be the most effective use of stressed 
resources. Economic enhancement supports the goals of every NGO; if women are 
successfully incorporated into the economy, a ripple effect occurs in other areas. For 
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example, NGOs that focus on women’s financial independence might not overtly deal with 
the promotion of women in politics, but the link between the two is easy to recognize. As 
women gain greater financial stability, they will feel more empowered to engage in political 
activity. 
Human security, hence, most closely reflects economic security. Failing to link the 
importance and magnitude of economic independence represents the greatest downfall of the 
human security literature. Ensuring basic sustenance and existential protection first begins 
with the assurance that opportunities exists to participate openly and equally in the economy. 
Economists and development scholars have long decried the importance of using a country’s 
entire human resource capacity. Adding the research from security scholars only strengthens 
the argument.  
Pragmatically speaking, addressing human security forces policymakers to take a 
proactive rather than reactive stance on security. The utility of securing borders and 
stockpiling weapons depends upon the behavior of other actors. Improving the daily lives of 
individuals, however, has an immediate effect on the population. And, most importantly, 
human security and national security are mutually reinforcing concepts. Ignoring either 
paradigm weakens the state. Thus, a secure state calls for security of the population and 
security within the population. 
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